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Abstract—MapReduce is a popular distributed data-processing
system for analyzing big data in cloud environments. This
platform is often used for critical data processing, e.g., in the
context of scientific or financial simulation. Unfortunately, there
is accumulating evidence of severe problems – including arbitrary
faults and cloud outages – affecting the services that run atop
cloud services.
Faced with this challenge, we have recently explored multicloud
solutions to increase the resilience and availability of MapReduce.
Based on this experience, we present system design guidelines that
allow to scale out MapReduce computation to multiple clouds in
order to tolerate arbitrary and malicious faults, as well as cloud
outages. Crucially, the techniques we introduce have reasonable
cost and do not require changes to MapReduce or to the users’
code, enabling immediate deployment.
Index Terms—Hadoop, MapReduce, Fault-tolerance, Multi-
cloud
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has emerged as the paradigm for out-
sourcing computation. Cloud service providers have been
building massive data centers that are distributed over several
geographical regions to efficiently meet the demand for this
service. These data centers typically contain tens of thousands
of commodity servers and use virtualization technology to do
provisioning of computing resources. Clouds are starting to be
used together [1] forming multiclouds. When the combination
of clouds is created by the users inconspicuously to the cloud
providers, such multiclouds can be called clouds-of-clouds [2].
The purposes of using several clouds vary, but common goals
are increasing performance and reducing costs.
Dependability problems in cloud services can cause great
losses to its users and are becoming increasingly common.
Hardware components are prone to soft and hard failures that
reduce their reliability and the availability of the cloud service,
with impact on the software running atop. Studies made at
Google and Microsoft concluded that errors in the DRAM,
chipset, and CPU of commodity servers are more prevalent
than previously believed [3], [4]. Therefore, fault tolerance in
cloud computing platforms and applications is a crucial issue
to the users, not to mention the cloud providers themselves.
Cloud computing has enabled computation of massive vol-
umes of data that traditional database and software tech-
niques had difficulty in processing in acceptable time [5].
One of the most popular distributed data-processing systems
for analyzing big data in cloud environments is Hadoop
MapReduce [6], an open-source platform based on Google’s
MapReduce paradigm [7]. The popularity of this framework
made the MapReduce model prevalently used for critical
applications such as medical research and finance, where
outputting wrong results and service unavailability may be un-
acceptable. Unfortunately, Hadoop does not deal with arbitrary
and malicious faults and does not scale the computation out
to multiple clouds to deal with availability issues.
In this article, we give an overview of our recent research on
scaling out Hadoop to multiple clouds for tolerating arbitrary
faults, malicious faults, and cloud outages (unavailability of
entire data centers). This is in contrast to previous work on
multi-cloud MapReduce (e.g., G-Hadoop [8]) that has not con-
sidered resilience, having focused exclusively on scalability of
computation. The design guidelines we propose include two
additional goals to foster adoption: the overhead should be
acceptable, and no changes to Hadoop nor to the user’s code
should be required.
To address these challenges, the design we propose for
resilient MapReduce systems is based on three core ideas. The
first consists in performing replication of the processing in a
set of clouds. Using replication may be considered expensive,
but cloud outages are becoming so common [9], [10] that
even cloud providers are exploring this approach (Amazon
recently launched the Cross-Region Replication service [11]).
Importantly, our solution minimizes the replication overhead
(Section III). The second idea is to leverage the diversity
provided by a multicloud environment in the design of context-
based scheduling schemes that distribute the processing across
clouds in such a way that performance is improved (Sec-
tion IV). Thirdly, the solution should include fine-grained
replication (at the task level) to achieve quick recovery in case
of a fault. This can be achieved without modifying the Hadoop
source code by means of a new abstraction we propose: the
logical job (Section V).
The core techniques introduced in our design emanate from
our experience in building two resilient multicloud MapRe-
duce solutions – Medusa [12]1 and Chrysaor [13]2 – and one
earlier solution that performs replication in a single cloud [14].
We evaluated our solutions in a real testbed, considering
several MapReduce applications, to assess the performance
in different scenarios (Section VI). The main result is that,
by applying the proposed techniques it is possible to scale
out Hadoop MapReduce to multicloud environments in order
to tolerate the above-mentioned classes of faults at reasonable
costs, while requiring minimal modifications to the users’ jobs,
1Code available at https://bitbucket.org/pcosta_pt/medusa
2Code available at https://bitbucket.org/pcosta_pt/chrysaor
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Fig. 1: Execution of a MapReduce job
and in a way that is compatible with any Hadoop MapReduce
version.
II. BACKGROUND
MapReduce was originally designed by Google for cal-
culating web search indexes and running other large-scale
data processing jobs [7]. Hadoop MapReduce is an open
implementation that appeared a few years later and that is
currently the most adopted [6].
The term MapReduce denominates both a programming
model and the corresponding runtime environment. As the
name indicates, MapReduce involves two functions: map and
reduce. The unit of execution is the job, which is typically
broken in one phase that executes map tasks and another
that executes reduce tasks (each task runs the map or reduce
functions once). Figure 1 shows a generic example of the
execution of a job. The input data is split into files called
splits. When a job starts running, each split is processed by
the map function in a map task (map phase). Then, the result of
the tasks are partitioned, transferred and sorted (shuffle&sort
phase). In the end, the reduce tasks process the partitioned data
using the reduce function (reduce phase). This simple model
can express many real world applications [7].
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Fig. 2: Architecture of Hadoop MapReduce
The main components of Hadoop are the Hadoop MapRe-
duce and Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) (see Fig-
ure 2). In Hadoop, MapReduce jobs are submitted to and
managed by a central component called resource manager.
The resource manager assigns map and reduce tasks to node
managers, monitors these nodes, and tracks the progress of the
job execution. The node manager is responsible for managing
containers where tasks run. Although the figure shows a single
node manager, typically there are many of those, as they are
the components that do the (large-scale) data processing. A
Hadoop MapReduce runtime works in a single data center.
HDFS is the default file system for Hadoop MapReduce. It
stores files broken into blocks that are replicated in different
servers (data nodes) for fault tolerance. HDFS can handle
many servers for scalability.
Hadoop was designed to be fault-tolerant as, with thousands
of devices (computers, network switches and routers, power
units), component failures are necessarily frequent. Hadoop
tolerates faults using two techniques: (i) monitoring and
restarting tasks when servers, node managers or the tasks
crash; and (ii) adding checksums to the files in HDFS to detect
data corruption in disks. However, these mechanisms only
work in a single cloud, cannot deal with cloud outages, and
only tolerate crash faults – not arbitrary or malicious errors.
In this paper we consider that MapReduce tasks, both map
and reduce, can suffer arbitrary faults, often called Byzantine
faults. These tasks may for instance stop or produce wrong
results. To deal with these faults we execute two or more
replicas of each task. We assume that there are limits on
the number of faulty replicas and clouds (including resource
managers), and that there is a proxy that does not fail (details
next).
In the following sections, we describe the three key tech-
niques we propose as guidelines for the design of multicloud
resilient Hadoop MapReduce frameworks.
III. JUST ENOUGH REPLICATION
Replication is a common strategy to ensure the integrity
and availability of distributed services in which individual
components may fail due to crash faults or arbitrary faults.
A. Replication for MapReduce
There are many algorithms to tolerate Byzantine faults
in the literature, but only one that does so in the context
of MapReduce [14]. That framework is a modified Hadoop
MapReduce that essentially replicates map and reduce tasks
(i.e., runs several copies of each), then compares the results
obtained by replicas to detect Byzantine faults. The main
challenge of this solution is the efficiency of replication. This
is achieved by requiring only f+1 replicated tasks to tolerate f
faults in case there are no faults, instead of the 3f+1 replicas
the typical Byzantine fault-tolerant state machine replication
algorithms would require [15]. However, this solution works
only in a single data center and as such does not tolerate cloud
outages.
Figure 3 presents generically our approach of replicating
MapReduce in a set of clouds, i.e., in a multicloud. The
proxy is the central component to which the client submits
a MapReduce job (note that this is transparent to the client –
she does not need to be aware of the presence of a proxy).
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The proxy is an intermediate component between the user and
the Hadoop resource managers installed in different clouds.
In this example, each cloud contains one Hadoop runtime,
and the proxy interacts with the several runtimes by sending
them Hadoop commands (e.g., instructing to start a job) over
a secure channel (SSH).
Consider that f is the maximum number of task replicas
and clouds that may fail (we normally consider these two
thresholds separately, but we are simplifying here). When a
job is submitted by the client, our solution involves executing
f+1 replicas, one per cloud. In the figure, we consider f = 1,
so the proxy selects two clouds – A and B – to execute the
replicas. During the execution, each task replica will produce
an output and the respective digest (a collision-resistant hash,
calculated, e.g., using SHA-256). The digests will be compared
to check if the result is correct: if there are f+1 equal outputs
then that output is correct as at most f replicas may produce
wrong results. Otherwise, a new replica is executed. If a cloud
stops responding a new one is selected (Cloud C in the figure).
We have developed two solutions that follow the generic
scheme of Figure 3: Medusa and Chrysaor. Their main differ-
ence is that they work at different levels of granularity: Medusa
deals with faults at the job level, whilst Chrysaor deals with
faults at the task level. Sections III-B and III-C describe these
solutions.
B. Replication in Medusa
Medusa replicates full jobs and compares only their final
outputs, more precisely, their digests. If it obtains f + 1
identical digests, then the outputs are equal, as digests are
collision-resistant (no two different outputs can produce the
same hash). Otherwise, the proxy cannot identify which of the
replicas is faulty and it will react accordingly; it only knows
that there is a disagreement on the result.
Medusa can deal with three faulty scenarios: (i) with
accidental faults, (ii) with malicious faults, and (iii) with
cloud outages. Initially, Medusa will launch f + 1 replicas of
the job in distinct MapReduce runtimes, running in different
clouds. When these jobs finish executing, Medusa will validate
the computation by comparing the digests of their outputs.
Medusa deals with accidental faults by re-executing the same
faulty job in the same clouds until it obtains equal results.
The rationale for re-executing in the same clouds is that
accidental faults are inherently intermittent, so it is to expect
they will eventually no longer affect the same job. This is in
contrast with malicious faults or cloud outages, that require
re-executions in an extra cloud. In the former case, because
one of the clouds cannot be trusted. In the latter, due to one of
the clouds being no longer available. In any of these cases the
framework re-executes the faulty job in another cloud until
it obtains f + 1 equal results. In the malicious case, if the
re-execution ends correctly it is possible not only to validate
the results but also to find which cloud is compromised. The
execution aborts if no final result is obtained and no more
clouds are available.
C. Replication in Chrysaor
Unlike Medusa, Chrysaor replicates tasks, not jobs. All map
and reduce tasks produce a digest of their output and the proxy
compares the digests of every set of replicas. This allows to
identify which tasks have produced different results and re-
execute them immediately after they finish, instead of having
to wait for the end of the job and to re-execute it fully (as
in Medusa). Faults in the map phase have to be dealt slightly
differently from faults in the reduce phase (this will be made
more clear in Section V).
Similarly to Medusa, when Chrysaor is in the presence of
a fault, it cannot identify which of the replica(s) is (or are)
faulty. When dealing with accidental faults, Chrysaor has the
ability to re-execute the task for which there was no f + 1
identical digests in the same clouds, until it obtains f + 1
equal results.
When dealing with malicious faults or cloud outages, it is
necessary to execute the tasks in an extra cloud, for the same
reasons as above. If the system is dealing with a fault in a
map task, Chrysaor executes the faulty tasks in another cloud
until it obtains f + 1 equal results. If the re-execution of the
map tasks has ended correctly, the solution has the capability
to validate the results and find which cloud is compromised
and exclude it from the rest of the execution. If a malicious
fault or cloud outages have happened during the execution of
the reduce tasks, it is necessary to run a new full job in a new
cloud, and then validate the output. The execution aborts if no
correct result is obtained and no more clouds are available to
re-execute the tasks.
Note that we explained the difference between handling
accidental faults and malicious faults as if the system was
able to distinguish them, which is not the case. In practice,
the system is configured with a threshold on the number of
times it tries to handle faults as if they were accidental, then
considers them malicious (i.e., starts using a new cloud).
IV. CONTEXT-BASED SCHEDULING
When we are dealing with several cloud providers, we are
facing heterogeneity in the server machines and the network.
Choosing the best clouds is critical to gain in performance.
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Notice that we do not mean the “best cloud” per se, but
the cloud with more resources available to the user at the
moment of submitting a MapReduce job. Naturally, if a job
runs in a particular cloud with high computational power and is
connected by high-bandwidth links, it ought to take relatively
shorter time for the job to finish. On the contrary, if a cloud
has low bandwidth links and low computational power, or if
it is overloaded, it might take longer for the job to complete.
Devising a context-based scheduler that distributes repli-
cated tasks across different clouds based on network through-
put and computational power requires predicting which clouds
(and which connections) will be the fastest. This prediction
needs to consider both the historical performance as well as
the current status of each cloud, allowing us to incorporate the
heterogeneity of the clouds into the scheduling decision. As
a consequence, our scheduler is split into two parts: one for
estimating data transmission time and the other for estimating
data processing time. We detail each metric in the following.
Estimating data transmission time. The data transmission
time between two clouds depends on (i) its geographical
distance, (ii) the network throughput, and (iii) the size of
the data to transfer. Considering that the throughput varies
with respect to the traffic load to other clouds (among other
variables), the framework needs to periodically monitor the
throughput for each pair of clouds in the system.
Estimating data processing time. The time for completing
a given MapReduce job mainly depends on the following
variables: (i) the capacity of the cloud running this job; and
(ii) the configuration of the job. For example, a high level
of parallelization (i.e., a large number of map and reduce
tasks) for the same job in the same cloud, and having tasks
accessing mostly local splits implies shorter data processing
times. As such, estimating the data processing time involves
having a scheduler that takes into consideration three types
of features: job configuration; cloud capacity; and cloud
overhead. We describe the representative features for each type
in the following:
 Job configuration features. Several variables in the job
configuration need to be considered for the scheduler
to predict the duration of the next job execution. These
include the size of the input data, the number of map
tasks, and the number of reduce tasks. These variables
are known before the job starts. Clearly, large input data
and a small number of map and reduce tasks imply long
job completion times.
 Cloud capacity features. Different clouds have different
characteristics, as they are composed of diverse hardware
infrastructure (number and type of servers, etc.). Features
of this type include the clock speed and the number of
cores of the CPUs, the total memory capacity, etc. These
variables define the cloud capacity, but they do not give
evidence of the load of the cloud in a particular moment.
 Cloud overhead features. These features assess the load
of the cloud at a specific time, in comparison to its base
capacity (cloud capacity features). For instance, if there
is resource contention in the cloud and there are jobs
waiting to be launched, most likely this cloud should
not be selected to execute the job. In contrast, if a
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Fig. 4: Scheduling example
cloud has sufficient free resources the scheduled job can
finish early, even if its capacity is relatively low. The
proposed scheduler uses the number of MapReduce jobs
that are currently running in the cloud, the percentage
of completion of the running jobs, the number of jobs
queued to run, and the size of the input data of the running
jobs as features to measure the cloud overhead.
Figure 4 shows an example of our context-based scheduler.
In the figure, we have three clouds with higher computational
power (Cloud A, B, and D), each with 4 machines with 4GHz
CPUs and 16 cores, and 16GB of RAM. Cloud C is less
computationally powerful with 2.8GHz CPUs with only 2
cores, and 2GB of RAM. Notice that Cloud D has a high load
in the MapReduce queue, which means that there are several
jobs waiting to execute. In terms of the network connections
between clouds, clouds A, B, and C are interconnected with
high-throughput links (shown with the plain arrows). The
remaining clouds are either connected with low bandwidth
links or are overloaded with traffic (dashed arrows). In this
example, Cloud A and Cloud B seem the best option to run
the next MapReduce job replicas.
The goal of the scheduler is to take into account both an es-
timation of the data transfer time and the data processing time
(considering both the job configuration, the cloud capacity, and
the cloud overhead features) to choose the best cloud to run the
next job. The scheduler estimates the time to transfer the data
between clouds based on the historic throughput measurements
and the size of input data to transfer. To estimate the data
processing time, the scheduler uses linear regression based on
the job and cloud features, in order to obtain the weight factors
that are part of the next job prediction.
V. FINE-GRAINED REPLICATION
Following our work in Medusa, the previous section mainly
considered replication of MapReduce jobs to obtain fault
tolerance and availability. In that section, even if a single small
task of a large job fails and produces a wrong output, then the
whole job will produce a wrong output and will need to be
re-executed.
To improve the efficiency of the system, it would be desir-
able to perform replication and re-execution at the task level.
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However, this fine-grained form of replication is a challenge,
as it would require modifying the Hadoop MapReduce source
code. The main reason of the problem is that the execution of a
job in Hadoop MapReduce cannot be interrupted “externally”.
The need to modify Hadoop is, however, problematic as it
would require users to use our own version of the platform,
hindering adoption (for instance, users could not use publicly
available versions, such as Amazon Elastic MapReduce).
We introduced a new abstraction in Chrysaor to perform
fine-grained replication without changing Hadoop: the notion
of a logical job. From the Hadoop viewpoint, each logical
job is a complete MapReduce job, but from the Chrysaor
viewpoint, there is one logical job to execute the map tasks
and another one to execute the reduce tasks (see Figure 5).
Moreover, if the replicas of a task produce different outputs,
a new logical job is created to re-execute only that task. The
use of logical jobs is transparent to the clients’ applications,
which request the execution of jobs as usual.
During the first logical job execution, each map task creates
a digest of the map output. In the figure, the output data is
represented as the squares exiting each map task. The digests
will be fetched and compared by Chrysaor to check if all map
task replicas produced equal results. This is the case in the
example (we are considering no faults), and so the second
logical job is launched. The second logical job cannot start
from the reduce tasks (a MapReduce job always starts from
a Map function). To solve this issue, we start this job with
an identity map task, a simple task that outputs the input
without modification. The second logical job will then read
the data that was stored previously using identity map tasks,
and perform the shuffle&sort phase before the reduce tasks
start. Each reduce task will produce the final output and the
system will compare the results. In the example, as there are
no faults, the results are equal and the job execution terminates
successfully. If that was not the case, a new logical job would
be created to re-execute only that task.
With the use of logical jobs, it is thus possible to have a
finer-grained control of the map or reduce tasks.
VI. EVALUATION
We evaluated the two systems that form the basis of
our multicloud resilient MapReduce design – Medusa and
Chrysaor – experimentally, by running the two prototypes
using several nodes in different regions of the Amazon EC2
service. We ran several real-world applications (available with
Hadoop). In this article we focus on the comparison of
the two replication approaches – job replication (Medusa)
and task replication (Chrysaor) – between themselves and
with the original Hadoop. We consider two applications: one
communication-bound (CB) and the other computationally-
intensive (CI). We present the results in Table I. We invite
the interested reader to obtain further information on the
evaluation, including a detailed analysis on its several results,
in the paper that proposed Chrysaor [13].
CB application No faults Arbitrary faults Malicious faults
Map Reduce Map Reduce
Original Hadoop 379 not tolerated
Job replication 438 823 1008
Task replication 516 547 1053 547 1054
CI application No faults Arbitrary faults Malicious faults
Map Reduce Map Reduce
Original Hadoop 557 not tolerated
Job replication 926 1831 1831
Task replication 777 816 1438 816 1438
TABLE I: Performance of job replication vs task replication (in
seconds, considering a 4GB input)
Comparison with the original Hadoop. One of our goals
was to have an acceptable performance overhead, so the table
shows average times for the execution of the original Hadoop
in the clouds considered. Our job and task replication solutions
have an overhead, as seen in the table, but it is reasonably
low (between 16% and 39%). An overhead was unavoidable,
as we are doing more computation: this is the price to pay
for the benefit of tolerating severe faults. The overhead is
limited mainly due to the principle of just enough replication
explained in Section III.
Performance without faults. The approach followed by
Medusa of replicating jobs achieves slightly better perfor-
mance when compared with task replication for the CB
application. The reason is the main overhead introduced by the
required logical job abstraction: the identity map tasks require
additional computational time. This additional computational
time came from the fact that the output produced by the map
tasks are larger than the input data. Overall, the characteristics
of the CB application have brought a penalty to the new
abstraction. Interestingly, the results are inverse with the CI
application. As the application is computationally intensive,
the relative cost of the identity maps is less pronounced. In
addition, one optimization allowed by the Chrysaor design
(namely, the generation of digests while the output is being
produced) overcomes the logical job overhead.
Performance with arbitrary faults. We tested both solutions
introducing arbitrary faults. The fine-grained replication at the
task level allows the system to react immediately when a fault
happens in the map tasks, which explains why task replication
was always the fastest solution in this case. When a fault
happens in the reduce tasks the result is different. As in the
case without faults, in the CB application, the re-execution
of identity tasks makes the overall solution slower than job
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replication. In the CI application task replication was always
faster than job replication, for the same reasons as before.
Performance with malicious faults. The conclusions of these
experiments are similar to the previous case. As before, repli-
cation at the task level was always the fastest when tolerating
faults in the map tasks. However, task replication was slower
when dealing with faults at the reduce side in comparison
with job replication when the job was not computationally-
intensive, again due to the need to execute identity map tasks
in the second logical job.
In summary, the main conclusions that can be drawn from
our experiments are that task replication is favorable for
workloads that are (i) more computationally-intensive and (ii)
centered in map tasks. For (i), in this sort of applications, the
relative overhead of the logical job abstraction is low. For (ii),
and independently of the nature of the application, a fault in
a map is always handled more efficiently with Chrysaor fine-
grained replication scheme. Importantly, in most MapReduce
jobs the number (and size) of map tasks is much larger than
the number (and size) of reduce tasks, which means that in
the common case the benefits of a fine-grained solution will
outweigh the overhead introduced to guarantee transparency.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the era of cloud computing, Hadoop MapReduce has
emerged as a popular tool for processing big data in a
distributed way. The MapReduce framework is prepared to
tolerate crash faults by re-executing tasks, but other faults that
can affect the correctness of results are known to happen and
will probably happen more regularly in the future. Moreover,
the design of MapReduce is targeted to a single data center
(a single cloud), which makes this framework vulnerable to
cloud outages, which are also common.
Based on our recent experience in building such systems,
in this article, we present three techniques to assist in the
design of multicloud resilient MapReduce systems. Namely,
minimizing the required replication; applying context-based
job scheduling, based on cloud and network conditions;
and performing fine-grained replication. Put together, these
techniques offer resilience at reasonable cost, and they are
immediately deployable using existing, unmodified Hadoop
MapReduce solutions.
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